About me

Welcome to my website!

I’m a PhD Candidate in Economics at the Paris School of Economics (PSE). I visited Columbia Business School in Winter-Spring 2024.

My primary research interests lie in the area of economics of education and labour economics.

You can download my CV here.

Contact

Email: desislava.tartova@psemail.eu

Teacher Value-Added in the Absence of Annual Test Scores: Utilizing Teacher Networks

[SSRN]

Abstract: This paper proposes a novel methodology for estimating teacher value-added in the presence of non-random teacher-student sorting and the absence of annual standardized student test scores. Rather than relying on lagged student test scores to control for nonrandom teacher-student sorting on student ability, I exploit within-student across-subject variation in test scores and teacher "networks" - teachers in the same subject who teach groups of students observed with a unique teacher in another subject. The resulting estimates closely recover the true parameters of teacher value-added in Monte Carlo simulations and align well with estimates from standard methodologies in New York City data where lagged test scores are available. The methodology substantially expands the research on teacher value-added, as the majority of educational settings do not rely on standardized testing in consecutive grade levels. I apply the method to French middle school teachers and find that a 1 SD increase in teacher value-added within school improves student scores by 0.10 SD in Math and 0.07 SD in French. I show that using a "hybrid" methodology - which augments the network estimator to control for lagged scores - in settings where lagged scores are available can outperform standard methods under specific sorting patterns by accounting for sorting on time-varying student unobservables.

Teacher Bonuses in Disadvantaged Schools: Can We Bridge the Gap Without Sacrificing Efficiency?

Draft available upon request.

Abstract: This paper studies whether policies that introduce a teacher bonus in highly disadvantaged schools can improve the average level of teacher value-added in these schools, and whether this is at the expense for a lower teaching quality at ordinary schools. I leverage a 2013 French national reform that significantly increased bonuses for teachers in highly disadvantaged middle schools and find that the reform led to a 20% relative increase in the average teacher value-added of Math teachers at these schools, relative to ordinary schools. This result is driven by a higher inflow of high-productivity teachers from ordinary schools and a reduction in the outflow of high-productivity teachers to ordinary schools and to outside the educational sector. I show that the policy did not negatively affect teacher value-added in ordinary schools that experienced teacher outflows, as the teachers who moved to disadvantaged schools had an average teacher value-added compared to their peers at the ordinary school but were relatively more effective than the incumbents in the disadvantaged schools. These findings suggest that salary bonuses in disadvantaged schools can enhance equity, specifically in STEM subjects, without reducing efficiency.

Who Leaves and Who Stays? Teacher Compensation and the Quality of Education

Draft available upon request.

Abstract: Teacher salaries have declined relative to their private-sector options, coinciding with rising teacher exit rates and raising concerns about the potential impact on education quality. This paper examines how the widening wage gap influences the retention of high-productivity teachers in the profession. I leverage the French institutional setting, where teachers cannot be dismissed by their schools, and exploit a reform that substantially increased salaries in highly disadvantaged schools to isolate labor supply choices. Using administrative data on middle school teachers and students in France, I find that the salary increase halted a previously rising trend in exits among high-productivity Math teachers in disadvantaged schools, relative to their counterparts in advantaged schools. This is consistent with a higher sensitivity of high-productivity teachers to salaries. In contrast, high-productivity French teachers did not exhibit a differential response, suggesting that changes to the wage gap affect the quality of the teaching force in STEM subjects but not in non-STEM ones.

Determinants of Teacher Value-Added: Evidence from French Teacher Surveys on Pedagogical Practices